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That the financial  sector  should  be liberalized  The financial  reforms  most likely to succeed was the orthodox view in the mid-1970s,  during  are those that give  banke.  an incentive  to engage a pendulum  swing toward  reliance  on the free  in safe and sound  banking.  When  excessive markeL  In the early 1980s,  the pendulum  swung  competition  is allowed,  the "charter  value" of back  to the left, based  partly on evidence  - banking  diminishes  to the point  that it is no especially  from Ladn America  - that overly  longer  profitable  for bankers  to behave  pru- rapid reform  had reail  costs, and partly on an  dently.
increased  appreciation  of financial  market
failure. Blind adherence  to free market  principles  A consideration  of finance's role, and a look was no longer appropriate.  Now a counter-  at how reforming  economies  have fared,  suggest cc  nterrevolution  is in sight, with some swing  also that gradual  reform  is often  to be preferred
back toward the view that the market  makes  a  in this domain.  Deregulation  of credit markets mess of it, but the government  makes  it even  and interest rates  can be counterproductive  in worse.  unstable  macroeconomic  conditions  and when
banks  are unsophisticated  or have weak balance Caprio  and Summers  agree  that market-  sheets.  And changes  in the charter  value may oriented  financial  systems appear  to do a better  evolve  only slowly  after reform. job than systems  with extensive  government
involvement,  but contend  that the assumption  Faster progress  and greater  efforts should  be that perfect competition  will solve all problems  made,  however,  in bank supervision  and regula- in finance  - especially  in banking  - can be  tion and in institutional  development,  including dangerous.  Information  problems,  implicit  or  accounting,  auditing,  legal and  judicial reform, explicit  government  guarantees  associated  with  and training  (of bankers  and other finance
deposits,  and externalities  associated  with the  professionals).
payments  system  make banks  unique.
In sum,  many economies  would  benefit from Governments  implicitly  recognize  banking's  less government  intervention  in financial  mar- uniqueness  - few allow  just anyone  to enter  kets, but the prescription  should  not be abrupt  or banking  - but public  pronouncements  and  total governnent withdrawal  from the financial observers' recommendations  often  favor a move  sector.  Rather  than intervening  heavily in credit to more competition.  Perfect  competition,  allocation  decisions,  governments  should focus however, is optimal  under the assumption,  on doing what only they can do: providing  an among  others, of no government  guarantee.  In  enabling environment  for the private financial fact, most governments  differ  only in how  and nonfinancial  sectors,  and ensuring  that explicit  they are about  their deposit  insurance  financiai  coerations  are safe and sound.
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The reform of finanicial  systems is an area of economics  which has seen broad swings
in economic thought. For much of this century, with notable exceptions  such as Schumpeter,
orthodox thoug'it was that money and finance did not matter or were not all that important in
the development  process. However,  by the mid-1970's, the orthodoxy  held that financial
repression  had to be stopped at all costs, and this liberalization  in the finanmial  sector led the
way for the more general acceptaice of the view that reliance on the free market should be
complete. Likewise,  in the early 1980s  the pendulum  swung back to the left in the approach
to financial systems a bit earlier than it did in other areas of the economics. Based partially
on evidence,  especially from Latin America,  that overly rapid reform had real costs, and
partially on an increased  appreciation  of market failure in finance, it was accepted  in the
financia 1 sector that b!ind adherence  to free market principles  was not quite appropriate.' And
a counter-counter  revolution  is in sight, with some swing back towards the view that the
market makes a mess of it but the government  makes it even worse.
The status of this debate is of direct relevance  for developing  countrie. and transitional
socialist  economies (TSEs), where financial  crises -- overt and hidden -- are ri'e and
authorities  are confronting  basic decisions  about the role of government  ia the financial
sector. 2 Some policy makers and advisers  in particular  appear  to be embracing "the market"
without a clear appreciation  of its limitations  in the area of finance. Moreover,  in addition to
the well known episodes of bank failures in the United States in the 1980s (and ongoing
concerns in the 1990s),  other industrial country governments,  including  those from
Scandinavia  to Japan, are experiencing  concerns  about -- and large actual and potential  losses
in -- banking.  Indeed, latest unofficial  estimates  place nonperforming  loans (NPLs) for the
Japanese banking system at 42-58 trillion  yen ($336-464  billion); if half of these NPLs result
I  Seminal articles are Akerlof  (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss  (1981).
2  See World Bank (1989) for a description  of financial  distress in developing  countries,  and Caprio and
Levine (1992) on the task of financial  reform in TSEs.2
in losses, the cost would be roughly equal to estimates  of actual losses the  &I, debacle
($150 to 225 billion) in the United States and a fortiori would represent a larger fraction of
GNP. 3
Developing  countries also offer lessons  on financial  refurm for other countries. In
some, banking systems that were restructured  just a few years ago are in difficulty  again.
And in several develoning  countries,  as in the industrialized  world, banking systems
liberalized  with little attention  to their initial conditions  encountered  subsequent  financial
distress. Given the generality  of financial  sector crises, then, it is opportune  to reflect on how
financ- functions  and on what should be the government's  role in the process.
This brief paper presents a few thoughts on finance that are relevant for policy makers
regardless  of their position concerning  government's  role in finance. The next section
reviews some recent empirical  evidence that lends support to the belief that market-oriented
financial  systems function better than those with heavy government  intervention. But no
study shows that the best intervention  is no intervention,  nor that the optimal ratc of
adjustment  to a state of less intervention  is instantaneous. Section 2 argues that, because of
implicit or explicit government  guarantees,  coupled with externalities  generated  by the
payments system, the financial system -- and in particular, those institutions called banks --
are special. We suggest that, unless a cot- Incing  way can be found to remove these
guarantees,  bank management  must resume its role as the main line of defence against unsafe
and unsound banking, not least because of the difficulties inherent  in external bantk
supervision. Therefore, incentives  (influenced  by the value of bank charters) should be
increased to encourage  management  to reassume  this role.  Section 3 notes that there may be
case for speed limits regarding some aspects  of financial  sector reform, and section 4 treats
special problems  where financial  systems are either rudimentary  -- as in the very low income
3  Cargill  and Mayer (1992) provide  present value  estimates  of the insolvency  and thrift bailout costs for
U.S. S&Ls, which represent as much as 4% of GDP in 1991. See Oxford  Analytica  (June 4, 1992)  for a
discussio.a  of official and unofficial  estimates  of nonperforming  bank loans in Japan. The larger fi,,ure cited in
the text for NPLs would be about 14%  of last year's GDP, and so the assumption  in the text (that half of NPLs
become actual losses) would  put a "guesstimate"  of potential  losses at 7% of GDP.3
countries -- or virtually nonexistent,  as in the TSEs.  Both situations  call for a creative role
fur government,  focussing  on what governments'  can do best, and not expecting  that the
market can solve all problems  satisfactorily.
We should note that prescriptions  to increase  the safety and soundness  of financial
systems should be offered with some modesty,  as it is difficult to select any country that has
succeeded. Our preferred E 'lution, 4 which relies on increasing  the franchise  value of bank
licenses,  means less competition  and perhaps less innovation,  so the gains from safety and
soundness  must be weighed against possible losses in terns of a narrower menu of assets or
poorer service.  Authorities  in each counry must weigh these factors  against the costs of
inaction, or of some other way of lessening  the riskiness  inherent  in many banking sysrems
today.  And careful analvsis of any changes to financial system regulation  is important,
especially as it takes some time for changes in the rules of the game to affect.  the internal
incentive systems within financial  institutions.
1.  Is It Real?
A first question, given the disparate  views on its significance,  concerns whether or not
finance matters. To some, financial  markets are chaotic casinos, whereas  many economists
regard it as dogma that a more efficient financial  system insures a more efficient allocation of
resources, funneling  capital from low to high value projects. Is there any evidence that this is
actually the case?  The first type of such evidence shows that fmancial  development  yields
more growth. By itself this evidence is unconvincing  because any notion of ho"' financial
deepening  operates could be expected to go along with growth. And it would not be
implausible  if a more sophisticated  financial  system develeped in anticipation  of future
growth.  So the attempt of this explanation  to disentangle  causality from tinming  evidence
4  It is useful tu add that there is little corsensus  on reform strategies  in this area, and that our proposed
solution  is not a policy  of the World Bank or its Board.4
seems to be inherently  limited. 5 A more interesting  attempt  by King and Levine (1992) finds
that, in a broad cross sectional study, countries with a greater proportion  of credit
intermediated  by commercial  banks  in contra.t especially  to central  banks in countries with
large directed credit programs)  grow faster, as do those with a greater share of credit being
extended to the private sector. Moreover,  this study finds significant  links between bank
intermediated  credit, credit to the private sector, and economy-wide  measures of efficiency.
Perh.ps most interesting  of all, it finds that financial  sector development  had a more robust
link to growt.n  than did other policies.
Although this cross-section  approach  finds some relationship  between the development
of the financial sector and growth, it does not show that complete  laissez faire is necessary  to
achieve adequate financial sector devOopment Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, King and
Levine find evidence from a cross section  of 90 countries  over the 1974-89  period that only
severe interest rate repression  has a significant  impact on growth (where countries are
grouped on the horizontal  axis in terms of their relative  growth rates).  This evidence is
consistent with a study by Gelb (1989), which found that although  interest rates and growth
are positiveiy associated,  most of the relationship  relates to reverse causation -- higher growth
raising efficiency and then interest rates.  Direct causation  from interest rates to growth was
thought to represent  more efficient intermediation  of funds by the formal financial  sector.
Also, Reynoso (1989) presented some evidence suggesting  that the relationship  between
saving and real interest rates may be an inverted  parabola, with saving increasing  most
significantly  when rates rise from sharply negative rates to near zero.
Thus empirical evidence appears to be consistent with a policy of ending severe
interest rate repression  but with still maintaining  some control of or intervention  regarding
rates, on the condition that no more than mild repression  is allowed. In other words, while
severe repression is disastrous  for financial intermediation  and economic  growth, slight
S  Jung (1986) tries to disentangle  whether finance  causes growth (in the sense of Granger)  or vice versa,
and finds not surprisingly  that the causality  goes both ways.Figure 1
Interest Rates  and Growth:  1974-89




Source: King and Levine (1992)5
repression may be prefe-  -ed to very high real rates, especially  when the latter results from
competition between banks with negative net worth. For example, Stiglitz (1993) has
suggested on several occasions  that demand deposit rates be limited to nu more than treasury
bill rates, especially where the latter are market determined. 'This  link would indirectly
reduce (wasteful)  competition  among banks for funds to make high risk loans in the hopes of
restoring their net worth to positive levels, as occurred in the U.S. S&L crisis.  Whc;e rates
are administered,  this rule would serve as a useful yardstick  for officials.
Another type of evidence for the importaace  of finance looks at changes in flows of
credit following the onset of financial  reforms, in particular  those that give banks greater
discretion over their lending and interest rate decisions. in Ecuador and Indonesia,
Schiantarelli  ct al (1992) show that credit flows changed significantly  following  the onset of
financial reforms,  with evidence that credit flowed to more efficient firms in both cases, even
after adjusting for variables such as the age, size, and export orientation  of firms. 6 Moreover,
in Indonesia there was a significant  lessening  of the extent to which small firms were credit
constrained in their investment  decisions  following  the 1983/88  reforms. These micro levtl
efficiency gains were matched by increases  in (some) economy-wide  measures  of the
incremental  output-capital  ratio (IOCR). 7 Efficiency gains appear less clear cut in Korea, both
in the firm level data and in the IOCRs. Small firms there also became less credit
constrained  by the end of the 1980s, but this is likely the result of a deliberate  government
policy rather than from a reduction  in the government's  role in the credit allocation process.
Again, however, where clear signs of efficiency gains were found (Indonesia  and Ecuador),
6  That efficiency  gains are possible  is plausible. Even in the United States the magnitude  of market
imperfections  that exist is impressive.  Somehow  the rich appear to have different investment  opportunities  than
those that economists  discuss; they scoff at either the five percent return available  on Treasury  bills or the eight
percent adjusted  real return available  historically  on stocks. Instead,  these investors  looking  at yields in all sorts
of sectors do not look at those with less than a 20 percent expected  return. And many Wall Street  houses make
substantial  profits on arbitrage  opportunities. One would  assume that unarbitraged  profit opportunities  are
present to a much greater extent in less developed  countries. In a microeconomic  sense, therefore,  liberalization
can make a significant  contribution  to growth.
7  Over a short period of time the IOCR is an unreliable  guide to efficiency,  and often is quite sensitive,  to
how investment  data are deflated.6
they were associated with a decrease in  --  not a;i elimination of -- government  intervention.
So while the combination  of cross-section  and country specific  evidence linking less-repressed
financial regimes to increased  efficiency is conviih.ing,  it by no means argues for an end to
all interventions,  but rather signals an appropriate direction  for many countries.
2.  Competition  in Finance
Is too much competition  possible in finance? Leaving  aside the problem of transition,
would the optimum optiniorum  be a freely and fully competitive  banking system in which the
financial cervices  had the character of perfect competition  as idealized  in economics
textbooks? Several reasons have been offered for being skeptical of that goal.  First, the
significant  externalities  related t*J  information  issues in finance all point to problems  if the
market is left on its own devices. Second, some aspects  of finance might be welfare-neutral
or even welfare.-reducing,  as when productive  activities  are interrupted  for the purpose of
speeding up the clearing of finiancial  markets. 8
But perhaps the most impertant reason for being skeptical of a free market as the
standard in finance, is what can be called the deposit  insurance  conundrum. Many countries
have explicit deposit insurance;  many countries  do not.  But in no country is it convincing
that the government would be willing to let large financial  institutions  collapse without taking
some kind of action. 9 Indeed, U.S. authorities  were not able to allow the Chrysler  Motor
Company  to close, so it is difficult  to believe that G.M., with its large financing company,  or
American Express, much less Citibank,  would be permitted  to fail.  Also, U.S. monetary
authoritie3  injected a great deal of liquidity at the time of the 1987  stock market crash, with
estimates up to $10 billion in the days immeulately  afterwards,  and an even larger sum beforc
it.  It is argued that heavy moral suasion was applied to encourage  banks to support brokerage
8  See Summers  and Summers  (1989) for an elaboration.
9  The Argentine  government  currently  is trying to convince  its populace  that it will let any bank fail, and
has allowed  some small provincial  banks to close, with depositors  taking  a loss.  However,  this new policy has
not yet been tested on a large bank.7
housts, and it is noteworthy  that although  58 houses  closed in 'he month after the crash, no
large brokerage firms went under.'°
Many economists  think that the case for deposit insurance  is clear -- their
grandmothers  should haN_  it but the rich should not.  However,  there are actually two reasons
for having deposit insurance  -- not only to protect the small saver but to insure the stability of
the  payments system by preventing  rapid withdrawal  of "hot" money.  in +he  modern era,
institutional  funds can be withdrawn  from a bank well before depositors  can even queue up
outside the bank's doors.  The attempt to limit deposit insurance  by concentrating  on small
savings alone, therefore, is not good stratcey, as it o nly encourages  large depositors to be
more nervous or to spread their large sums into smaller accounts.
Some type of deposit  insurance will need to be provided,  but is this a function of the
private sector or the government? The argument  to let the market take care of it is, at least
on the surface, persuasive. Without government-provided  insurance,  depositors  would be
more inclined to try to moni ,r their own institutions,  and banks would be encouraged  to
form coinsurance groups or other coalitions,  such as the clearing house system in several U.S.
states in the 19th century.'" However,  notwithstanding  the successes  during this period, these
systems encountered  problems  when banks were encouraged  or compelled by legal limitations
to concentrate  their risks.  Large numbers  of geographically  separated,  undiversified  banks are
difficult for banks themselves -- or their supervisors -- to monitor.
To be sure, banks can be made safer and easier to monitor in many countries  by
allowing or encouraging  them to diversify. The U.S. banking system has been more prone to
crises and failures, compared with its Canadian counterpart,  largely because of the U.S. ban
on interstate branching, which only began to erode in the 1980s,  but has yet to be abandoned.
Thus Canadian supervisors  have both fewer and more diversified  institutions  to monitor.
In  Garcia (1989) provides  these data and a view of Fed policy  at the time of the crash.
"  See Calon iris (1992, 1993)  and other references  provided  there.8
Many developing countries'  financial systems are more similar to that of the United States:
their banks are undiversified due to a combination of small economic size and the
concentrated structure of individual economies, in conjunction with capital controls which
prevent banks from holding any significant proportion of assets overseas.  Consequently,
without an abandonment of controls on capital flows (which in many countries is conceived
of as the last stage in the reform process) and an easing of branching restrictions among
countries, many developing country banks will necessarily be riskier than their industrial
country counterparts.
Authorities have to be concerned about making banks safer because ultimately they
will be held accountable when (sufficiently large) banks fail.  The counter-argument, that
depositors can monitor banks effectively, is not convincing.  Empirical studies of the stock
market performance of U.S. banks in the 1980s find little evidence that stock prices were able
to anticipate the downgrading of banks to problem status.'2 In some cases, the market
appears to have gotten the dire -tion of change generally right but the magnitude of price
decline was not statistically significant.  Moreover, for those banks that Simons and Cross
found did experience stock price declines (12 of their sample for which the market at least
got the direction of change right, even if statistically insignificant), little negative commentary
was discovered in the financial press about these banks.  But perhaps most damaging was
their finding that insiders -- managers and directors -- were more often buying shares
immediately before the downgrading!'3 So there can be little credibility to the assumption
that depositors will be able to monitor banks effectively.  Governments will therefore be
impelled  to provide explicit or implicit deposit insurance; even a government which wanted to
renounce this role could not, given that so ma'iy other governments are providing this
insurance.
12  See Simons and Cross (1991).
13  A Machiavellian  cynic might say that the evidence on insiders probably reflects  deliberate buying high
to cover their  tracks for still larger sales further in advance of the bank's  demise.9
What does this mean?  The basic economics invoked here are clear enough  -- a bank
with few assets has a strong incentive to take risks.  These risks enable it to compete for
deposits more effectively and if it does not win, it is the taxpayers who lose.  Even banks that
are not inclined to take advantage of deposit insurance will be encouraged to do so in order to
compete for deposits.  A few bad apples therefore create strong pressure toward involvement
in risk taking by bidding away deposits.  So bank failures likely will continue to be a part of
the developing country financial landscape barring major changes.  Supervision is one part of
the solution to this problem; any part of the world without supervision proves that this is true.
But supervision faces chronic problems in many countries, typically being starved of
resources and subject to severe pay constraints.  Moreover, both political and economic forces
lean towards supervisors keeping silent about problem banks until net worth is already
negative.  And the above evidence on stock market anticipations of bank failures also does
not give solace to those who believe that supervisors will be able to serve as the main
defence against failure.  So while better supervision is needed in many countries -- both
developed  and developing -- we argue that it is unrealistic to expect government supervision
to be the main line of defence.
A second solution is often dubbed "narrow banking," meaning that banks can be made
safe by being required to invest solely in short-term riskless securities, such as treasury bills.
Only safe banks would be "backed" by the government, while all other financial institutions
could offer a variety of financial products -- even, perhaps, demandable, fixed-rate deposits --
but would not be allowed to call themselves banks and would not be eligible for government
guarantees.'4 Proponents of this solution point to the success of money market mutual funds
and assume that narrow banks will behave similarly, while critics say that there is insufficient
supply of riskless assets (T-bills) to back the potential demand for riskless deposits.  But both
views neglect changes in the price of riskless assets; in particular, these prices will rise in a
narrow banking world if society values such assets so highly.  This will occur to the delight
14  This recommendation dates back to Simons (1948), in the best Chicago tradition, and  is closely related
to the recommendation  for only allowing Islamic banks, which are in theory checkable money market funds.  See
Litan (1987) for an updated view.10
of government debt oftices but will also lead narrow banks -- and the less supervised
nonbanks -- to want to hold some less secure paper." 5 Indeed, one possible result would be
that nonbanks would offer deposit accounts backed by higher yielding assets, which could be
subject to default.  Thus, while this solution has much to recommend it,  authorities may be
reluctant to try an untested model, and it will only prove effective if nonbanks, regardless of
size, are allowed to fail.
Another possibility is to raise capital requirements to high levels, but the difficulty is
first, that it is hard to get international agreement on capital requirements and second, -- and
relatedly -- that capital requirements appropriate for small, low income countries may be
inappropriate for more diversified, higher income  neighbors.  Yet, if one country were to
raise capital requirements above that of others -- without a commensurate increase in expected
profits -- then that country's  banking system would move offshore.'6
A better solution to the deposit insurance conundrum relates to bank profitability  and
capital.  Successful banking institutions require some cushion of profitability and capital, a
cushion that could be driven out by turning the financial industry into one characterized by
wide-open entry.  As is true for nuclear power plants, free entry is not sensible in banking, as
unfavorable chain reactions -- bank runs -- are possible, and the adverse fallout can be severe,
in terms of the damage done when payments systems are destroyed and barter returns. 7  One
of the reasons why the United States had a financial crisis in the i980's,  rather than in the
1950's, is not entirely macroeconomic, as the 1950s was a decade marked by recessions and
is  With the decline of interest rates in the United States in 1991-3,  there has been a move away from CDs
and safer instruments  in search of higher  yields -- even the junk bond market  has enjoyed  a resurgence. A move
to narrow banking could reinforce  this switch.
16  It might be argued  that offering  deposit insurance  would  tend to raise franchise value  and thereby limit
the offshore movement  of domestic  banks. However,  this effect is only true ceteris  paribus,  and can be easily
lessened by giving out too many bank licenses.
17  And supervising  banking may be as difficult as regulating  nuclear power  plant: at least -- or at least
insofar as scientists are aware -- nuclear particles  do not have an incentive  to misrepresent  themselves  to
regulators!11
sluggish growth.  At least in part, it is that over time, teci.nological change and regulatory
arbitrage led to reductions in barriers to entry in the deposit taking and lending business,
eroding bank profits and forcing banks to accept or vigorously solicit riskier business.  In
other words, the franchise value of a bank license was sharply reduced.  When that franchise
value was eroded, bankers stood to lose less by going bankrupt; with no franchise value there
was no reputation to protect and no reason to avoid going bankrupt.  And the S&L problem
was worse than that in the commercial banking sector largely because more severe restrictions
on asset and liability choices of the former group led to a greater erosion of franchise value; a
government guarantee coupled with low franchise value can be expected to attract all sorts of
gamblers to an industry.'8 L
So a solution to this conundrum should include some way by which the franchise
value of bank licenses is enhanced.  Entry limits are one way: authorities should be prepared
to restrict entry in order to allow higher bank profits and a build up of capital, in this way
leading to an excess demand for bank licenses.  Indeed, as Calomiris (1992a) has described, it
was by restricting entry and allowing for accumulations of profits (bank charter value) that
American banks grew and promoted economic development in the early  1800s.  When bank
licenses have a significant value, bank management will be more likely to set up internal
controls and oversight systems that will help to preserve their franchise.  Then bank managers
will be the first line of defence, with supervisors there to assist, working with managers, in
ferreting out unsafe and unsound banking practices.  Supervisors will of course be needed to
assure that required capital and needed provisions actually are there, especially since even
with a high franchise value, some entrepreneurs with very short-term horizons could still be
attracted to banking; a bank license in the wrong hands could indeed become a license to
steal.  Note that this solution has some similarities with that of raising capital requirements, in
that owners would have a larger present investment or expected future profits at stake, either
of which would encourage safe and sound banking.  Also, higher capital requirements would
18  Weisbrod, Lee, and Rojas-Suarez (1992) argue that the franchise value of bank licenses has declined in
the United States and Japan.12
drive banks out of existence and would result in a higher spread between borrowing and
lending interest rates.'9 But the franchise value solution does not rely on getting international
agreement.  Rather than driving banking offshore, greater franchise value would create an
excess demand for bank licenses in the country where a bank franchise is truly valuable.
Depositors might try to move abroad if insufficient competition led to low deposit rates, but
bankers will quickly deduce that deposits are more mobile than loans, given information
problems, and price their products accordingly.
In the United States some may argue that this solution is not feasible: nonbanks have
already "won over" the better risks (blue chip clients), and financial sector firms can get
around any barriers set up to make banking inore profitable.  However, this view neglects the
use of regulations  in the United to reduce the franchise value of bank licenses, in particular
by limiting interstate branching.  A complete end to these barriers would lead to rapid
consolidation of U.S. banking and likely boost the value of surviving banks.  Truly national
banks -- certainly fewer than the  12000-13000 at present -- would be well-placed to compete
with nonbanks, especially if the current drive to widen the ability of banks to engage in
securities-related  business continues to be expanded.  With stronger, national banks, there is
little reason to believe that the U.S. bank failure rate would differ significantly from the '^r
lower rate in Canada or Germany. 20
In developing countries and TSEs, financial engineering is far less advanced, and bank
19  With higher capital levels, banks would need larger interest  spreads to show the same return on equity,
ceteris paribus. So in moving  from lower to higher  capital requirements,  one would  expect io see exit from
banking until the risk-adjusted  return attained  its previous  alignment  with that in other industries.
20  It must be emphasized  that reliance  on this solution  will only work within limits: if entry is restricted  so
tightly that substantial  monopoly  profits  appear, nonbanks  be attempt even more to offer products  similar to
these offered by banks. But within limits we think  that it is feasible  to have profitable  banks and nonbanks
operating side-by-side. Securitized  finance or the issuance of paper directly  to investors  has enjoyed several
booms (the 1920 and the 1980s most notably)  but usually  retrenches  during the contractionary  phases as
investors  are reminded  of the risks they face. Also, investors  confronted  with the choice  of bank deposits,  bills,
bonds, and stocks, often choose to diversify  among all of the above instruments. If nonbanks  encroach
sufficiently  on banking, authorities  will be faced with  either extending  guarantees  to these activities  or allowing
banks into new forms of finance.13
supervision skills are far less developed. Thus keeping entry limited and thereby promoting
the franchise value of bank licenses may be the best hope of fostering the spread of safe and
sound banking to these countries. But paying attention  to franchise  value (or bank capital)
alone will be insufficient in small, highly specialized  economies,  as the franchise  value (or
capital requirements)  of banks needed to ensure safe and sound banking might be quite high.
In these cases authorities  will need to encourage  safe international  diversificajion  of banks as
well.  Indeed, one could envisage  a menu of choices on entry and portfolio  limits.  When
confronted with the choice between allowing  pockets of wealth to accumulate at home or
permitting the investment  of domestic  savings abroad, eventually  politicians may converge
more to the former solution. 21 Authorities  will then have to struggle with the tradeoff
between too little competition  and innovation  and potentially  unsafe banking practices.
3.  Constraints  on Reform:  possible  speed limits
Should that deregulation  which is desirable  happen as quickly as possible? The above
qualifications  notwithstanding,  the direction that is appropriate  in most countries  of the world
is clear.  Many countries  have excessive  and/or inappropriate  financial sector regulations  that
are aimed at meeting a variety of goals, such as that of providing  cheap credit to the
government and to preferred  sectors or individuals. Yet contrary to simple minded
economics, it seems that for both macroeconomic  and microeconomic  reasons one should
move forward with some caution. First, some of the seeming successes,  Malaysia and Korea,
moved quite gradually in their reform  efforts, in part because they enjoyed the luxury of
21  Just as local U.S. banks  often ended up financing  money-losing  ventures  when they ventured  outside
their markets,  and industiial  country  banks lost sizeable  amounts in foreign  markets,  developing  country  banks
also could lose money by investing  abroad. But they could as well invest in global mutual  funds and thereby
enjoy a stable return uncorrelated  with that in their own market. In this sense they would become  less risky
institutions.  The main point is that in countries  with 20% to 50% of GDP accounted  for by one product, swings
in the terms of trade will routinely  wipe out all but the exceptionally  well capitalized,  or highly profitable,  banks.14
favorable macro circumstances. 22 Second,  financial  reforms affect incentives,  and it likely
takes some time for the ramifications  of these changes to filter through  to affect internal bank
incentive systems. Banking systems that have been designed to respond to government
directives will not instantaneously  adjust to commercial  methods even if injected with fresh
capital and told that all restrictions  are off.  Third, financial  repression,  whatever its other
aspects, is a way of collecting government  revenue,  directly when the banking system has to
hold government bonds and indirectly  when interference  with their intermediation  reduces
interest rates and therefore makes it possible for government  bonds to remain more attractive
than they otherwise could.
One of the lessons that learned after a decade of experience  with structural adjustment
programs is that fiscal stability is essential  to the broad consequences  of reform and that it is
often true that bad taxes are better than no taxes. Where the fiscal situation is difficult, it is
appropriate to undertake reform more gradually than would otherwise  be done.  Just as there
is a dynamic within the government  whereby  many are worried about the budget deficit but
more concerned about their favorite  government  program,  there are similar tendencies  among
many economists  who specialize  in certain sectors. Financial  specialists  want financial
repression  reduced or eliminated;  trade oriented economists  want tariffs reduced; human
resource experts want more total spending;  and infrastructure  advisers want more
infrastructure. So in the end, nobody is left to focus on the problem of the budget deficit.
This orientation is understandable:  after all, governments  are not known for achieving
budgetary savings in the absence of strong pressures,  and sector specialists  may respond by
pressing for more than they reasonably  hope to obtain. Bargaining  strategies aside, the most
sensible course of action would then appear to be to set out a reform program over a period
of years, putting pressure on the budget but giving time for realistic budgetary realignments.
In the context of financial reform,  a government  that is funding  itself by the forced allocation
of bonds to commercial  banks might be weaned of this habit over a fixed time horizon.
22  And when macro circumstances  seemed poor, Malaysian  authorities  put reform efforts  on hold and
reasserted  control of interest rates until borrower  (and bank) net worth improved  (see Zainal. et al, 1992).15
Another reason for gradualism  in the financial  sector is that reform in this area cannot
prudently run too far ahead of those in the real sector.  Abrupt reform, such as immediate
interest rate deregulation  or bank recapitalization,  should be linked explicitly to real sector
changes.  Complete interest rate deregulation  is unwise when basic macro stability is
wanting, as the danger of high and fluctuating  rates can impair the stability of otherwise
viable firms. 23 As Stiglitz notes, if the government  is guaranteeing  deposits, then it is
difficult to justify deposit  rates above the riskless rate on short-term  T-bills. Bank
recapitalization,  another "sexy" step in financial  reform, is often wasteful where steps are not
taken to assure that good money will not be thrown after bad.  These steps not only can be
expected to entail replacing  bank management  and installing  an effective  incentive system and
risk evaluation and control processes, but also in many cases ensuring  that factors external to
the bank are corrected  as well.  This may mean removing  legal restrictions  that limit portfolio
diversification  or, as in many TSEs, restructuring  enterprises.
It should be clear, however, that the case for gradualism  does not mean inaction.
Governments  can move rapidly to eliminate  the grossest form of credit subsidies  and restore
interest rates to levels at least close to inflation rates. In fact, Malaysian authorities  removed
much of the subsidy element for directed  credit early in the reform process. Many financial
sector reforms are long gestating, can be started at little cost immediately,  and are sine qua
nons for private sector development. Training of commercial  and central bankers, creation or
upgrading of accounting  and auditing  standards (and professions),  and legal and judicial
reform all help financial  markets function by improving methods  for contract monitoring and
enforcement  and will speed the development  of markets.  In most of these areas there are
significant  externalities,  so that without government  involvement  less investment  will be
forthcoming;  foreign assistance and expertise also can help to speed up the process, either by
providing advisory services or funds conditional  on the achievement  of certain reforms,
especially those where domestic  interests are a barrier.
23  Gertler and Rose (1992) make this point clearly.  See also Caprio, Atiyas. and Hanson  (1994) for
additional preconditions  for successful interest rate deregulation.16
4.  Special  cases?
At least two areas stand out where there appears to be a special case for "extra-
market" action.  The first set concerns bank regulation  and the role for government
intervention  in the poorest economies,  those classified as low income developing  countries.
The above discussion of franchise value is particularly  relevant here: if many industrial
countries, including Japan and the United States, have difficulties  in managing  a banking
system, the problems  in this area must be very real.  In very poor countries,  the ability to
supervise financial institutions  will be even more limited than in the industrial world, and
risks may be more pronounced,  especially if the country's productive  structure  is relatively
undiversified  and capital controls limit diversification. And without substantial  foreign
assistance,  there usually is only quite limited bank supervision. In this environment,  allowing
the market to create its own financial  institutions  through  free entry entails great risk.
Instead governments  can intervene  and restrict the supply of bank licenses and attempt to
ensure that only reputable  persons enter into banking. The creation of monopoly  rents will
both encourage  the internal control over banking,  without which it will self destruct, and also
stimulate the creation of pockets of wealth which can be used to advance  real sector
development. 24 Indeed, some small, low income countries already have just a few banks that
make high pre-tax profits, but then the government  taxes them away, so the banks have little
franchise  value to preserve.
An even greater difficulty  for poor countries  concerns government  intervention  in
pricing and allocating credit and in encouraging  the spread of the banking  habit, especially to
rural areas, where the cost of delivering  banking services  is high.  As several authors have
noted, the grounds for intervention  often are unclear,  and the record in many countries
24  Governments  could license  a few foreign  banks  and depend  on the concern for the bank's own
reputation  to encourage  them to monitor  themselves  and to bear the costs of imprudent  lending. It is argued that
Uruguayan  authorities  have relied successfully  on this effect.17
inspires little confidence. 25 For both the industrial and agricultural  sectors,  the scarcity of
medium and long term finance in many low income countries is not disputed, but the popular
solutions -- set up an institution  that will only intermediate  medium and long term funds or
require existing banks to lend long some part of their resources -- have routinely failed.
These solutions are based on the £lotion  that such finance is not provided because of
information  imperfections. Unless public sector banks are better at collecting funds or
borrowers  more prone to pay back when loans are subsidized  -- in both cases usually far from
the truth -- neither the information  asymmetries  nor enforcement  problems  can be corrected
by these direct interventions. Thus, Calomiris,  Hubbard  and Stock (1986) find that defaults
on U.S. government  credit in agriculture  were double those on private loans, while forced
term lending regularly is cited as a factor behind a retrenchment  in intermediation.
Rather than information  problems,  other culprits -- macro instability and government
failure to honor its own commitments  -- often appear when term finance is moribund. Also,
where the legal system reduces to creditors  the value of collateral,  short-term  contracts are a
way of maintaining  control over borrowers,  as noted by Gertler and Rose (1992).  Judicial
and legal reform, clarifying  property rights, and possibly subsidizing  the development  of
information  capital are areas in which governments  could better contribute  to alleviating  the
shortage of term finance.  The former  areas would help improve the returns to intermediation
once banks and other financial firms had established  themselves,  while the latter would
26 contribute to a reduction in the fixed costs of establishing  a financial  institution.  Even a
postponing of tax liabilities,  perhaps by allowing  little or no taxation (or an investment  tax
credit) during the initial years of a firm's life, could help improve borrower  net worth and
thereby increase access to credit. Once initial banking  relationships  are established  (after
perhaps 2 years or so), this form of subsidy  could be ended. But this is a last resort
25  See Besley (1992) and Calomiris  (1992) for a review of the arguments  for intervention.
26  The subsidy could be paid to both banks  and borrowers,  in effect buying  down the interest rate on
initial loans for new borrowers,  but of course would  have to take account  of budget pressures,  as noted above.
Caprio (1992) and Gertler-Rose  (1992) make this argument. Calomiris  (1992) notes the importance  of fixed
costs in setting up banks in rural areas, but the argument  holds wherever  information  is scarce.18
intervention,  as it may lead to abuses and could prove unnecessary.  Banks and informal
lenders have shown themselves  to be willing to invest in acquiring information  where they
can exploit the profits to be made from lending (Aleem, 1990). Term finance can also be
encouraged  by ftu3tering  the development  of short-term  money markets, whereby
governments,  usually through  their central banks, can encourage  the development  of the
trading skills necessary  to the growth of longer term markets. 27
In rural areas, the spread of the banking habit and the encouragement  of finance to
agriculture also has been an especially  popular area of government  involvement. As Akerlof
(1970) and Calomiris (1992) note, agriculture  is particularly  fragile because of the
concentration  of risk and high fixed costs of establishing  financial  intermediaries  in rural
areas.  As with lending to small and medium  enterprises,  governments  have little direct ability
to solve information  problems, but may be able to intervene  if high costs are keeping out
financial institutions. Often, these high costs result from unclear property rights or other
barriers to land sales, so governments  can help especially  by improving  the enabling
envirownent in these areas, as is relevant not only in low income developing  economies but
in reforming socialist  states (Calomiris,  1992). Where lending is restricted  because of
monitoring  problems, increased  reliance on peer monitoring  may well prove fruitful, as in the
case of Graneen Bank (Stiglitz, 1990). Since society at large benefits from the spread of the
fmancial sector, some subsidization  of these institutions  appears  warranted.
Unfortunately,  governments  often see greater benefits than appear to exist both from
directing credit and from encouraging  the spread of banking, and especially  tend to pass of
the costs to the commercial  banks.  They also get excessively  involved in the credit process,
leading commercial  banks to cease to assess credit risk or monitor the loans, as the risk is
viewed as ultimately  born by the government. And ruling that banks must have a certain
number of branches in rural areas or grant credit on preferred  terms is costless  to authorities
in the short run, which is why they tend to do too much of what appears to be a socially
27  Meek (1991) lucidly  explains  this point in the cases of Malaysia  and Indonesia.19
beneficial act.  In the process, bank franchise  value is eroded and the banks ultimately
respond to this new, and perverse, incentive  evironment.  Thus the challenge  for
govemments  is to keep interventions  modest and not force the financial  institutions to absorb
the costs.  For directed credit schemes,  keeping programs relatively small and broad-based,
like those in Malaysia,  which also allowed banks to cover their average  cost of funds plus a
generous markup, appears to offer the best chance of succeeding  both in directing credit to
targeted groups and in avoiding  large losses. The absence of a large subsidy element in
particular figured prominently  in explaining  the success of the Malaysian. 28 Interestingly,
Japan's reliance on directed credit was much less than many have thought, with only about
10% of total credit accounted  for by "policy-based"  loans [JDB, 1993]. And any subsidy was
quite small, first because real interest rates were maintained  in the neighborhood  of zero and
second, and more importantly,  because effective  monitoring  and control systems ensured a
virtually 100% repayment  record, many times the rate in some developing  countries today.
Other actions to help producers  hedge risks, such as by fostering commodity  futures
markets or allowing  residents to hedge in international  commodity  futures markets, would
also contribute to the development  and soundness  of domestic credit markets. Where
borrowers are unable to hedge themselves,  specialized  agriculture  banks that have been
encouraged by many governments  concentrate  risk further,  which may account for the poor
results seen in these institutions  during the 1980s,  when many cemmodity  prices were weak.
If government authorities  wish to encourage  rural finance, they should prefer to sponsor
diversified  institutions  -- recognizing  the diversity  of rural economic activities in most
developing  countries, as well as the need for loan diversification  in financial institutions  --
and promote the use of hedging  devices.
What of the special problems  of transitional  socialist economies  (TSEs)? In some
sense they are like low income countries  in having undeveloped  accounting  and enforcement
systems,  with poor or "noisy" information  channels. However,  the problems  of pre-existing
28  More subsidized credit was available directly from the budget. See Zainal et al (1992).20
loan losses are much more formidable. TSEs also make no pretense about having either
skilled bank supervisors  or skilled bankers. Since these economies  will have to function for
some time with virtually no bank supervision  and will be in environments  fraught with risk, a
radical solution -- endowing bank licenses with a high franchise value, legislating  quite high
capital adequacy requirements,  or moving to a narrow banking system -- offers the best
chance of successful reform.  The polar extreme -- completely free banking -- makes sense
only  when the government  is prepared  to allow depositors  of all institutions  bear losses;
otherwise, "free" banking will be expensive for the budget. Since government  resolve often
weakens when losses get large, this extreme solution is dangerous.
Another extreme is to ban all debt since the environment  is so risky (McKinnon,
1991). This solution pays too little attention  to the need to finance the new private sector and
neglects the point here that banking can be made safe when bankers have adequate incentive
to police themselves. Our preferred  solution, prcmoting  franchise  value, may be close to
McKinnon's in practice:  with initially only a few licenses being granted to competent
bankers, in all likelihood  there will be a relative scarcity of debt finance compared with a free
banking model, as he is encouraging. We would argue, however,  that more profitable
banking would lead to a healthier and less expensive  banking sector, once the costs of
financial crises are considered,  yet would still allow for some debt-based  financing.
Financial institutions  in TSEs are faced with the challenge  of financing the emerging
private sector while assisting with the restructuring  and.'or  closing of state enterprises,  often in
an environment  of unstable average  and relative prices and fluctuating  macro policies. An
additional complication  is that for most of the TSEs, the government  presently  owns much of
the financial  sector and cannot  just walk away from the institutions. 29 One approach -- close
down all public sector banks and hope that private banks arise -- will not be tolerated. Most
countries instead will likely gravitate towards a combination  of trying to reforrn existing state
banks while encouraging entry, in particular  from foreign  banks or joint ventures.
29  Caprio and Levine (1994)  elaborate on this argument.21
Even with entry, however,  some governme,nt  involvement  is essential during the
transition period.  if all TSE banks were '.-Lraculously  transformed  into world class
commercial  institutions,  they would  likely stop lending to all but a handful  of private clients
because of the riskiness  of the environment. So while it may be useful to allow banks on
their own to grant loans only on a commercial  basis to small state sector companies,  no
government -- certainly no banking system -- will long withstand the closure of a large
portion of its industrial base. There is therefore no choice but to have credit decisions for
large state enterprises made by a government  body, either in conjunction  with a state bank or
through the budget. To ensure that this temporary  solution does not become  permanent, a
limit on the proportion  of total credit extended  in such a non-commercial  fashion could be
established and then lowered over a pe iod of years. 30 The g,.  .rnment  will likely become the
caretaker of at least one institution  to which many of the bad loans may be transferred,
whether in a new fund or an existing bank.  Since governments  routinely are poor at
collecting debts, any efforts in this direction should be contracted  out to private firms.
Concluding  thoughts
The common thread to this paper is the notion that while market-oriented  financial
systems demonstrably  appear to do a better  job than ones with extensive government
involvement,  the assumption  that perfect competition  will solve all problems  in finance is
dangerous. Finance is different  from steel or autos because of the externalities  associated
with the payments system, the importance  of information  problems,  and the implicit  or
explicit government guarantees  associated  with deposits. We have argued here that, while
many governments  need to reduce their intervention  in the financial  system, these differences
imply that perfect laissez faire competition  may well not be the ideal.  While governments
3"  The government  also is the owner  of state enterprises,  many of which  are transforming  themselves  into
financial  intermediaries  through  the accumulation  (involuntarily  on the creditor  side) of interfirm  credits. In
Romania  and Russia, these arrears  have reached  80% to 100%  of GDP.  As owner of the responsible  firms,  the
government  must limit these credits if inflation  is to be controlled. Caprio and Levine (1994) elaborate  on this
problem.22
should recognize this point -- few allow anyone to enter banking -- public pronouncements
and the recommendations  of many observers are usually to recommend  a move to more
competition. This view only makes sense under the assumption  of no government  guarantee,
but in fact most governments  do provide deposit guarantees,  and only differ in the degree of
explicitness  of the scheme.
Informed  views of what finance is about, combined  with a look at how reforming
economies  have fared, also suggest that gradual reform  is to be preferred. Deregulation  of
credit markets and interest rates is likely to be counterproductive  as long as macro conditions
are unstable and banks are both unsophisticated  and have weak balance  sheets.  As has been
clear in other settings, deregulating  when banks are "bust" and bankers unskilled  leads to
gambling;  the resulting losses and the increased volatility  of financial  markets can set back,
rather than advance, the move to more market-oriented  systems. However,  faster progress can
and should be attempted in the areas of institutional  development,  as noted above.
Governments  that have a choice should not attempt to move from a severely repressed
financial system to a lightly regulated  one overnight. To be sure, some governments  have
little choice: TSEs are beginning  a wide ranging  reform process effectively  with no financial
system, and need to move quickly. Still, complete  laissez faire would be disastrous  there, as
would attempting  to move rapidly to the types of systems  in force in industrialized  economies
today, where banks freely make their lending decisions  largely apart from the political system.
While some new private banks can be licensed to deal with the new private sector, the
transformation  of the existing state banks will require at least a 5-10 year commitment.
Lastly, in all countries, governments  must remained  focussed  on doing what they do best:
providing an enabling environment  for the private financial  and nonfinancial  sectors. While
market failure clearly can exist, governments  should be rationed in their ability to use this
argument as a justification for intervention.Bibliography
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